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THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION
A SUMMARY View of the economic situation prevailing in
1929 is essential to an understanding of the changes that
followed so quickly. The shift in the direction and velocity
of movement wassopronounced, in that year, that it is well
to survey the of pre-recession movements and the
character of the pre-recession situation before proceeding to
the events of the recession itself.'
FACTORS AFFECTING THE PRICE STRUCTURE OF 1929
Conceiving of the price structure as a set of relations pre-
vailing among the prices of all the commodities and services
that enter into economic activity, it is useful to consider the
system existing in 1929 as the resultant of the following gen-
eral conditions and forces:
i. As a foundation, providing the general framework of
the 1929 structure, we must note the relations that had been
built up over a considerable period of gradual change before
the War. The chief influences bearing upon the price sys-
tem during this period, which we may say extended from
i8g6 to 1914, may be summarized in these terms:
a. A slow, secular rise in the price level caused aggregate com-
modity values to increase more rapidly than the volume of phys-
ical production, tended to keep labor and overhead costs down,
1Amore detailed account of certain tendencies prevailing in the United
States prior to the recession of 1929isgiven in Economic Tendencies in
the United States (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932).
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relatively, and contributed to certain of the changes in price
relations noted below.
b. Raw materials rose more rapidly in price than manufac-
tured goods. The price differential representing fabricational
costs was steadily narrowed.
c. The real per unit value of products of American farms, in
raw state, was steadily enhanced. The average real value(i.e.,
per unit purchasing power) of other commodities declined.
d. Consumers' goods(goods in shape for use by final con-
sumers) and producers' goods (articles of capital equipment and
goods intended for consumption, after further fabrication) ad-
vanced in price at substantially equal rates.
e. After increasing in price during the expansion that cul-
minated in 1906 and 1907, commodities intended for use in the
construction of capital equipment fell appreciably in relative
value.
f. Productivity in manufacturing industries advanced notably.
Labor costs in manufacturing were reduced, relatively to general
prices. The real wages of manufacturing labor were barely main-
tained during this period of industrial expansion.
2. Superimposed upon the foundation provided by these
movements were the shifts arising from the revolutionary
economic changes of 1914—22, a period covering the War and
the first great post-War recession. Changes in price relations
during this period were in part of internal origin, reflecting
the play of non-monetary forces. Perhaps more important,
however, were alterations due to drastic changes in monetary
values. These were transmitted with varying degrees of lag
and in varying intensities to the different elements of the
price system.
In summary, we note these movements:
a. The rapid price advance of 1916—20 and the recession of
1920—21 brought a sharp reversal of earlier relations between
the prices of raw materials, particularly industrial raw materials,THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 41
and manufactured products. War demands, the exploitation of
new territory, and the stimulation of a rapidly rising price level
had caused a rapid expansion in the output of raw materials.
The checking of War-time demand, the inability of raw material
producers to adapt themselves promptly to the new situation,
and the greater promptness of manufacturing producers in adapt-
ing production schedules to changed conditions were factors in
this reversal. In 1921 raw material producers throughout the
world were in a position of extreme price weakness, and manu-
facturers in a relatively strong price position.
b. The steady pre-War improvement of the average status of
farmers was followed by War-time affluence. Then came abrupt
decline in 1920—21 to a position lower than any that farmers
had known in a quarter of a century.
c. Producers' goods in general were materially cheapened as a
result of the price shifts of 1914—2 1, while the real per unit value
of consumers' goods was greatly enhanced. Buying and selling
prices were alike favorable to the reaping of profits in the opera-
tion of business enterprises, when the advance of 1922 started.
d. In contrast to this favorable price situation on the operating
side the costs of capital equipment in and construction
costs in particular were high in 1922.
e. Although employmentfellsharplyintherecessionof
1920—21, real wage rates were substantially advanced as a result
of the War and immediate post-War shifts. Labor costs, as a
consequence, were relatively high at the opening of the industrial
expansion of the nineteen twenties.
3. The price structure that existed in 1922 was subject,
during eight years, to a new set of influences. In brief sum-
mary:
a. The physical volume of production increased between 1922
and 1929 at a rate in excess of that which prevailed during the
decade preceding the World War.
b. The productivity of manufacturing labor increased more42 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
rapidly than during any other period for which records are avail-
able. (Acceptable records go back to 1899.)
c.In the expansion of this period an increasing proportion
of the nation's productive resources was devoted to the output
of durable goods and of luxury goods, both being types marked
by high elasticity of demand.
d. Articles of capital equipment were being produced at a
rate materially greater than, that prevailing for physical goods
in general.
e. Heavy foreign lending and rapid growth of the volume of
export trade characterized this period. The dominant export
groups consisted of goods of elastic demand.
f. The aggregate amount of capital funds available to Ameri-
can industry increased at a notable rate. This helped to main-
tain an upward swing in security prices for an exceptionally long
period. It facilitated the improvement of mechanical equipment,
and was thus a major factor in enhancing the productivity of
labor and in contributing to technological unemployment.
g. The period as a whole was marked by an apparent loss of
flexibility in certain important elements of the price structure.
This loss of flexibility—a loss due in part to the steady advance
of overhead costs, price regulation, trade agreements, valorization
efforts—paralleled movements that tied together even more closely
the various elements of the industrial structure, and made a
continuing and flexible adjustment of working parts more essen-
tial to economic stability.
h. Commodity prices were marked by a slightly declining trend
during the first post-War decade. A declining trend intensi-
fies the difficulties of readjustment after .a cyclical recession, and
compels more thoroughgoing liquidation than is necessary when
the secular push of prices is upward.
In passing now to a brief account of 1929pricerelations
in the United States, we deal again only with certain salient
aspects of the general situation.THE PR:E-RECESSION SITUATION 43
PRICES OF RAW AND PROCESSED GOODS; PRICE POSITION
OF THE FARMER
Raw materials as a class rose in price in the United States
between 1922 and 1929; processed goods declined. Although
these movements tended to correct the extreme disparities
created during the 1920—2 irecession,they left raw materials
in an unfavorable position in 1929, in terms of pre-War re-
lations. This is clearly shown by an examination of relevant
index numbers of wholesale prices.2 These measurements
19221929 1913 19221929
Rawmaterials 100 io6 100 133 141
Manufacturedgoods ioo g8 100 155 152
indicatethat in average per unit worth, in terms of commodi-
ties in general at wholesale, raw materials were in 1929 some
5 per cent lower than in 1913,manufacturedgoods 2 per
cent higher.(In deriving these measurements the index
numbers of wholesa].e prices given in the table have been
divided by the corresponding index of general commodity
prices, at wholesale.) In default of accurate and compre-
hensive records of changes in production costs we may not
appraise this shift with precision. It is known that produc-
tion costs of many raw materials were reduced during the
decade and a half following the beginning of the War.3
Some of the technical gains that manufacturing industries
2 Unless otherwise noted, the index numbers presented in this monograph
have been computed by the National Bureau of Economic Research from
quotations compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The detailed
measurements, with notations concerning the number of commodities repre-
sented, are given in Appendices III and IV.
3Importanttechnical improvements occurred inthe copper,lead,zinc,
silver and petroleum industries, and the production of tin and wheat was
marked by increasing mechanization. C.. Raw Material Prices and Business
Conditions, Melvin T. Copeland (Publications of the Graduate School of
Business Administration, Harvard University, Vol. XX, No. 3, May 1933).44 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
had enjoyed earlier were now realized in extractive indus-
tries. But it is doubtful that such cost reduction equaled
the very substantial declines in production costs in manu-
facturing industries during the decade prior to 1929. The
advantage brought by relative price movements to manu-
facturing industries during these years was probably real.
The loss that the American farmer suffered in price posi-
tion in 1920—21,aloss which wiped out the gains of many
years, was in part made up during the succeeding eight
years. Dealing first with the situation in wholesale markets,
we have the following record of changes in the, wholesale
19221929 191319221929
Allproducts of American farms, rawioo 110 100 137 150
Allother commodities ioo g8 100 151 148
pricesof raw farm products and all other commodities (in-
cluding processed farm products and raw and processed non-
farm products). Between 1922 and 1929 the prices of raw
farm products gained distinctly on other commodities. As is
shown by the entries on the 1913 base, this gain more than
corrected the 1922 disparity, putting farm products slightly
above the general average in
Wholesale prices, although useful as a common denomi-
nator in the comparison of changes affecting different groups
of producers, do not necessarily indicate the true buying and
selling position of the farmer. To define this position we
compare the course of prices actually received at the farm
4Inthis, as in all other comparisons of index numbers, we must note the
limitations attaching to measurements of price changes over time.Only for
staples of relatively unvarying quality are these measurements accurate.
Changes in qnality and in design, among fabricated goods, may not be
adequately translated into terms of price and are, indeed, usually ignored
in the construction of index numbers. Errors due to such changes are
usually slight over short periods, more serious in comparisons covering a
number of years (see footnote 6, p. 45).THE PR:E-RECESSION SITUATION 45
with changes in the prices of goods bought by farmers. The
1922 .1929 1913 .19221929
Pricesreceived by farmers ioo 111. 100 131 145
Pricespaid by farmers for production
and family maintenance ioo 103 100 148
indexof farm prices relates to thirty major agricultural
products; the index of prices paid is based on payments by.
farmers, at retail, for articles used for productive purposes
and for direct consumption and use.5 Here, again, a sub-
stantial gain is shown for the years between 1922 and 1929,
but the advance started from a lower relative position in
1922 than is indicated by the wholesale price quotations. In
1929 the per unit purchasing power of farm products, mea-
sured with reference to the prices paid by farmers, was lower
than in 1913.
This record leaves out of consideration possible changes
in production costs of farm products and changes in the
quality of some articles bought by farmers. It is certain that
changes of these types occurred between 1913 and 1929.
While the resulting gains may not have been sufficient to
offset the price disadvantage revealed by the above index
numbers, there is no doubt that by 1929 farmers, as a class,
had made great strides towards recovering their pre-War
economic status.6
5Indexnumbers computed by the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
The index numbers on the pre-War base are only slightly modified if the
standard of reference be the five years, August 1909toJuly 1914,insteadof
the single year 1913.
August
July 1914 .1922.7929
Pricesreceived by farmers 100 132 146
Pricespaid by farmers 100 149 153
6Themeasurements of changes in the purchasing power of farm products,
cited in the text, are derived from the comparison of price changes among
two groups of commodities—farm products, and commodities bought by
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MARGIN BETWEEN THE PRICES OF RAW AND PROCESSED
GooDs, 1929
We have stressed in an earlier section the economic im-
portance of the differential between the prices received for
materials by primary producers and prices prevailing for
finished goods at the other end of the productive-distributive
process. This differential measures the cost of those activities,
so characteristic of modern economic life, that intervene be-
tween the extractive processes and the final consumption of
physical goods. Available data do not span the entire range
of this differential, but it is possible to measure the changes
over substantial portions of this important margin.
WHOLESALE PRICES
The customary comparison, in tracing changes in the
manufacturing margin, is between the prices of all raw ma-
terials and all manufactured goods. This is significant, but
it is not entirely appropriate to the purpose; for a consider-
able group of raw materials consists of products such as
farmers for use in production and in family maintenance. The first is com-
posed of standard raw materials(wheat, cotton, hogs, cattle,etc.)subject
to only minor variations in quality. The second includes diverse materials,
such as farm machinery, automobiles, tractors, many of which have been
marked by steady improvement in quality with the passing years.Itis
estimated, for example, that the quality—the productive efficiency—of farm
machinery increased 70 per cent between pre-War years and 1932(estimate
cited in Index Numbers of Prices Paid by Farmers for Commodities Bought,
1910—1934.U.S. Department of Agriculture, September 1934). Automobiles
have been marked by similar improvements in quality, over the period of
their general use. It is obviously erroneous, if long periods are involved, to
set against the prices of goods of unvarying quality prices of equipment that
has improved so substantially in quality, without taking account of quality
changes. The above measurements, therefore, certainly overstate somewhat
the degree of loss in the purchasing power of farm products between 1913
andpost-War years.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 47
vegetables, eggs and milk, which are purchased in their raw
form by ultimate consumers. Such raw consumers' goods are,
in general, subject 1:0 price-making forces quite different
from those that operate among raw materials subject to more
or less complex processes of fabrication before being ready
for use, either for purposes of consumption or as instruments
of further production. It is the latter group of raw producers'
goods that should properly be compared with manufactured
commodities, if interest attaches to changes in the manufac-
turer's price margin.
Price tendencies prevailing among these two classes of
goods during the years preceding the 1929 recession are
shown by the accompanying index numbers, which define
19221929 1913 .19221929
Producers'goods, raw ioo 103 100 127 131
All processed goods too 98 100 155 152
changesin the average wholesale prices of broad classes of
goods at successive stages of production.7 (They do not re-
late, we should note, to precisely the same commodities at
these stages.) The net effect of the eight years of expansion
that began in the United States after the depression of 1921
and continued without grave interruption until 1929 was to
reduce the relative margin between the prices paid by manu-
facturers for their raw materials and the prices, at wholesale,
at which processed goods were sold. Raw producers' goods
rose slightly in price, manufactured goods declined slightly
on the average. If we neglect questions relating to costs, pro-
ductivity and changes in degree of fabrication and in volume
of output, questions that naturally affect the interpretation
of the changed differential, we find an apparent tendency
See Appendices II—IV for index numbers by years, with an explanation
of their derivation.48 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
towards a reduction of fabricational charges between 1922
and1929.
But a longer view is needed if the situation in 1929 is to
be properly understood. The preceding measurements in-
dicate that in 1929, as well as in 1922, the margin was ex-
ceptionally wide, that the costs of the services of the manu-
facturers (and, in some degree, distributors) to which this
margin relates remained high, relatively to pre-War stand-
ards, during the whole post-War period. In 1929, at the peak
of the expansion of this period, the average per unit price
of raw producers' goods was 31 per cent above the 1913
average; the average per unit price of manufactured goods
was 52 per cent higher. In comparison with these wide dif-
ferences the slight narrowing of the margin between 1922
and 1929 is not impressive. The post-War decade, it appears
from this evidence, was marked by high prices for the services
covered by this basic differential.8 It is to be expected that
such a change would be paralleled by notable shifts in the
real incomes and in the relative economic status of different
economic groups.
Measurements based upon a threefold division of com-
modities, which includes a representative group of semi-
finished goods as well as raw materials and finished com-
modities, suggest that this widening of the manufacturing
differential was not universal, in fabricational processes.
Thus, while raw producers' goods rose 33 per cent between
1913 and 1929, and all finished goods rose 54 per cent, the
group of semi-finished goods advanced only 28 per cent in
8Thegeneral relations between the price index numbers for raw producers'
goods and manufactured goods are not altered when a broader pre-War base
is used:
1909—1913 19221929
Producers'goods, raw 100 127 132
All processed goods 100 158 155THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 49
price.9 These measurements indicate that the costs that had
risen, and that dominate the general index numbers pre-
viously cited, were those relating to the later stages of the
manufacturing process, rather than to the simpler manu-
facturing processes that intervene between raw and semi-
finished stages.
Further aspects of the change prior to 1929 in the major
differential between prices of raw and processed goods must
be studied, and possible reasons for it sought, in a more
detailed examination of price differences and manufacturing
costs. In the following summary we distinguish three groups
of producers' raw materials and corresponding classes of
manufactured goods.
19221929 191319221929
Crops,raw, producers' ioo 107 100 127 136
Crops, processed ioo 97 100 146 142
Animal products, raw, producers' tooio8 too 140
Animal products, processed ioo 110 100 150 165
Minerals, raw, producers' too 97 100 140 135
Minerals, processed too 95 100 159 151
Metals, raw, producers' 100 io6 100 121 128
Metals, processed too io8 100 151 164
The manufacturer's margin in the fabrication of farm
crops appears to have been reduced rather substantially be-
9 Following are the index numbers of wholesale prices for these three com-
modity groups. The entries in this table, it should be noted, do not relate
to identical commodities at three different productive stages. Indeed, many
classes of goods included in the 'raw' and 'finished' groups are not included
in the 'semi-finished' group. But the three sets of index numbers may be
taken to be generally representative of three successive stages of production.
NO. OF
COMMODITIES191319221929
Producers'goods, raw 90 100 129 133
Producers' goods, semi-finished 47 100 134 128
Allfinished goods 319 100 156 1545° PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tween 1922 and 1929. No significant change occurred in the
other two main groups. The measurements on the pre-War
base give a different picture. The manufacturing differen-
tial was distinctly wider in 1929 than in 1913 for animal
products, appreciably greater among mineral products, and
slightly greater for farm crops. In the subgroup metals a rise
of but 28 per cent in the prices of raw materials subject to
processing was accompanied by an advance of 64 per cent
in the prices of manufactured goods. Our search for groups
exercising preponderant influence upon the major differen-
tial leads us, then, to two important commodity groups—
animal products and metals. In the fabrication of these
goods, apparently, the advance in costs between 1913 and
1929 was greater than the rise in prices of raw materials, and
of commodities in general.
The part played by fabrication costs in the price changes
of the pre-recession period is strikingly revealed by a series
of index numbers of price changes among manufactured
NO.OF
GROUP COMMODITIES19221929 191319221929
A 99 100 io8 100 129 140
B 157 100 96 100 156 149
C 87 100 95 100 185 175
goods,classified according tothe degree of fabrication
through which they have passed.'° Group A is made up of
10 Total costs of fabrication, including profits, are defined by the figures on
'value added by manufacture' in Census compilations. The percentage rela-
tions of fabrication costs to total value of product, upon which the present
classification rests, are based upon figures for 1925. This is true also of the
figures relating to wages and total value of product, upon which the classifi-
cation in the next table is based. Some changes occur, of course, from year
to year but these changes are not such. as materially to affect the present
classifications.
The price quotations used in constructing these index numbers are those
compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data used in the
classification of commodities are drawn from the Census of Manufactures.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 51
commodities for which fabrication costs constitute less than
25 per cent of the total value of product, group B those for
which fabrication costs constitute from 25 to 50 per cent of
total value of product, and group C those for which fabrica-
tion costs areper cent or more of total value of product.
From 1922 to 1929 slightly fabricated materials (group A)
increased in price, more heavily fabricated goods declined.
But this movement must be interpreted with reference to
the situation in 192:2. Here we find a definite relationship,
slightly fabricated goods being lowest in price, relatively to
1913,morehighly fabricated goods standing next in order,
with most heavily fabricated goods far above the other two
classes. These differences had been reduced by 1929, but the
same general relations persisted. As against a relative of 140
(1913base)for slightly fabricated goods, we have 175 for the
highly fabricated articles in group C. These clear progres-
sions, prevailing in 1929 as well as in 1922, give unmistakable
evidence of the part played by manufacturing costs (includ-
ing profits) in shaping post-War price differences.h1
If we base our classification upon wages expended in the
manufacturing process, instead of upon all fabrication costs,
similar conclusions emerge. Below are given index numbers
of wholesale prices for three groups of commodities, those
for which manufacturing wages constitute less than io per
cent of the total value of product (group D), those for which
they make up fromtO 25 per cent of total value of prod-
ii We should avoid the implication that the chain of causal relations neces-
sarily runs from higher fabricational costs to higher selling prices. In general,
when the level of prices is rising, it is probably true that conditions in the
markets for finished products allow higher fabricational costs to be incurred
and higher profits to be l)aid. (Even at such a time, of course, the force of
competition may prevent a rise in the fabricational margin.) When the level
of prices is falling, the active factor in expanding the fabricational margin
(relatively to general prices) is more likely to be found on the cost side.
Overhead and labor costs are less flexible than material costs when business
conditions necessitate a downward adjustment of prices and costs.PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
uct (group E), and those for which they make up 25per
cent or more of the total value of product (group F). In 1922
NO.OF
GROUP COMMODITIES.19221929 191319221929
D 123 100 io6 100 131
E 139 100 94 100 i6i 152
F 8i 100 ioo 187 iSo
goods in group D stood only 31 percent higher in price than
in goods in group F stood 87 per cent higher. Here is
a striking difference. By 1929thediscrepancy had been re-
duced,but we still find a definite progression; those goods
for which wages were a relatively small item in total value
were lowest in relative price, while goods with relatively
high labor costs were highest.
We have noted, in using index numbers relating to the
prices of specific classes of goods at different stages of the
productive-distributive process, that precisely the same com-
modities are not necessarily represented at these different
stages. More exact (though more limited) comparisons are
possible if we deal with the prices of identical commodities
at different productive stages. Index numbers derived from
such prices, which are given in Appendix V, show conflicting
movements between 1922and1929,inrespect of the fabrica-
tional margin. More significant for the immediate purpose
are index numbers on the 1913base.With only three ex-
ceptions in the entire list of eighteen groups of related com-
modities, the relative margins between the prices of primary
products and of more highly processed goods were distinctly
wider in 1929thanin 1913.Thelong-standing pre-War
tendency towards a narrowing of this differential was clearly
reversed, if we take account of the net change over this
sixteen-year period.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 53
FABRICATION COSTS
Some limitations attach to a study of price differentials
through the comparison of price movements at different
manufacturing or distributive stages. Production costs may
vary with changing industrial productivity; the degree of
fabrication may vary; the share of overhead costs allocated to
each unit of manufactured output may vary markedly with
changes in the volume of production. We may approach the
same subject from a different direction, and avoid certain of
the more important of these sources of possible error, by trac-
ing changes in the costs and selling prices of American manu-
facturing in the earlier account we devote our
attention to the situation in 1929 and to the changes occur-
ring during the years of post-War expansion and the longer
period dating from '914.
INDEX NUMBERS MEASURING CHANGES IN MATERIAL COSTS,
SELLING PRICE AND FABRICATION COSTS, MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES
(All measurements relate to average price and cost changes per unit of
manufactured product.)
19231929 1914 1923 1929
Sellingprice ioo 91 100 159 145
Costof materials 100 8g 100 153
Fabrication costs, plus profits 100 95 100 174 i66
Labor costs 100 86 100 182 157
Overhead,plus profits 100 102 100 i68 172
Theserecords reflect changes of the same general charac-
ter as those defined by the measurements already reviewed.
Between 1923 and 1929 material costs (which here include
Thetechnical method'; employed in deriving these measurements are
described in Economic Tendencies in the United States. The measurements
are derived from compilations of the Census of Manufactures, and are thus
available only for Census years.54 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the costs of semi-manufactured goods) dropped, the selling
prices of manufactured goods declined, and fabrication costs
declined, though by a smaller amount. In the present analysis
we may distinguish two elements of fabrication costs, labor
costs and a composite of overhead costs plus profits. The
decline in fabrication costs during the period of post-War
expansion appears to have been the resultant of two conflict-
ing movements—a substantial drop(14'percent) in labor
costs, a small advance (2 per cent) in overhead costs plus
profits. In interpreting these movements we should recall
that these years were marked by the steadily increasing mech-
anization of industry, and that this process tended to lower
labor costs and to increase overhead costs. The capital funds
at the disposal of manufacturing corporations were increas-
ing rapidly, and if mechanization had proceeded at an equal
rate the addition to current overhead charges would have
been substantial. A definite tendency in this direction un-
doubtedly prevailed.
For a true conception of the 1929 situation a longer per-
spective is required. If we look back to 1914wefind that the
present evidence clearly substantiates that of the earlier
sections. Over the fifteen years 1914—29 the cost off materials
(including semi-finished goods), per unit of manufactured
product, increased 36 per cent; the selling prices of finished
products advanced 45 per cent; fabrication costs, plus profits,
increased no less than 66 per cent. The services of fabrication
agents were definitely more expensive in 1929, by an amount
materially exceeding the rise in the general price level. The
two constituent items of fabrication costs both advanced
more than the average selling price of manufactured prod-
ucts. The rise in overhead costs plus profits was the greater.'3
13Theseindex numbers, based upon a larger group of industries, differ
somewhat from those cited in Economic Tendencies.THEPRE-RECESSION
FIGURE 5
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CHANGES IN AVERAGE SELLING PRICE, COST OF MATERIALS AND
ELEMENTS OF FABRICATION COSTS PLUS PROFITS, PER UNIT OF
PRODUCT, 1914—1929
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tative factors cloud theinterpretationof these results. The
particular 'price' that is defined by fabrication costs, per unit
of product, does not relate to a standard and unchanging
economic good, especially over periods a decade or more in
length. As for the changes from. 1914 to 1929, a detailed study
of the record suggests that several important factors con-
tributed to the notable widening of the fabricational margin
(Percentage deviations from 1914
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These general movements are shown graphically, in dol-
lars of constant purchasing power at wholesale, in Figure5.
Supporting dataappear inAppendixVI. Here,again, quali-56 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
we have observed. Real advances in fabricational costs, in
excess of. the concurrent increases in selling prices, occurred
among numerous industries turning out standardized prod-
ucts. There is good evidence (other than the statistical data
here cited) that manufacturing labor and ownership were in
positions of strategic advantage, after the World War, in
their relations with producers of raw materials, and that their
rewards increased correspondingly. But itis also true that
the degree of fabrication to which materials of manufacture
were subjected was increasing. In 1929 the actual physical
contribution of fabricators to the average product of manu-
facture was greater than in 1914. Refinement and improve-
mènt of fabrication in the making of machine products,
elaboration of fabrication in the production of food products
and in preparation for the market, were characteristic
of this period. This qualitative change was unquestionably a
factor in the widening ,f the fabricational margin that was
so distinctive a feature of the years between and 1929,
intensifying the influence of a substantial real rise in the
price paid for the services of fabricators.'4
The fifteen years prior to the recession of 1929 were
marked by an çxceptionally rapid advance in the output of
durable goods, both capital equipment and durable con-
sumers' goods. The production of durable goods increased
112 per cent, as compared with increases of 63 per cent for
semi-durable goods and 71 per cent for perishable commodi-
ties. (Each reference applies to the output of manufactured
goods. The measurements given are based upon index num-
bers constructed by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.) Examination of index numbers relating to the Va-
14 In certain cases in which the degree of monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
control was increased during this period the widening of the differential
between material costs and final selling price may be attributed to this
control, rather than to an increase in fabricational costs proper.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 57
rious elements of production cost, for these three groups of
manufactured goods, reveals substantial equality in respect of
changes in material costs, between 1914and1929.Thechief
differences appear in the movements of labor costs (up 69
per cent for semi-durable goods, 54 per cent for perishable
goods and 49 per cent for durable goods) and overhead costs
plus profits (up 76 per cent for semi-durable goods, 75 per
cent for durable goods and 66 per cent for perishable goods).
The very considerable rise in overhead costs plus profits for
durable and semi-durable goods is notable, the more so be-
cause of the great increase over this period in the volume of
durable goods produced. Indeed, such charges for durable
goods had increased, no less than 13percent per unit of
output during the period of rapid industrial expansion be-
tween 1923 and 192g. Heavier overhead charges, in the broad
sense in which that term is here used, were an important ele-
ment in the maintenance of a high fabricational margin
during the post-War period.
PRICES OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND CONSUMPTION GOODS
In distinguishing between the prices of goods for capital
equipment and of articles intended for direct human con-
sumption or use we are setting off two major fields of eco-
nomic activity. Processes of investment and of consumption,
processes relating to the building up of the instruments of
production and processes directed towards the satisfaction of
immediate human wants, are conditioned by these prices.
Proper coordination, of these two central types of activity is
essential to the maintenance of order in our economic life.
In a comparison of price changes among these classes of
commodities we should use the prices of finished goods only.
For our interest lies now, not in the margin representing
fabricational or distributional costs, but in the relative costs58 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
of capital goods, finished and ready to perform their instru-
mental role in production, and of commodities ready for
direct and final consumption. Itis these prices of final
products that are significant in shaping the courses of invest-
ment15 and of consumption. But we are faced here by de-
ficiencies of data. Available quotations on the finished instru-
ments of production—machinery and equipment of all sorts
—are few. As the best approximation to changes in such
prices we shall follow changes in the prices of processed
goods intended for use as capital equipment or in the con-
struction of such equipment. Since we are interested not in
absolute prices but in price changes, the approximation will
be reasonably accurate. Price changes among these goods are
compared, in the accompanying summary table, with changes
in the prices of goods ready for use by final consumers and in
the general level of wholesale prices.
1922 1929 1913 19221929
Producers'goods for capital
equipment, processed ioo 100 165 i6o
Consumers' goods, all 100 104 100 155 i6o
All commodities ioo 100 100 148 148
Between 1922 and 1929 prices of these two types of goods,
both representing terminal stages of the productive-distrib-
utive diverged somewhat; goods for capital equip-
ment fell slightly in price, consumers' goods rose. But over
the longer stretch of years between 1913 and 1929 the two
groups moved upward by the same relative amount—6o per
cent, as compared with an advance of 48 per cent in the
general price level. The high 1929 prices of both these
classes stand in marked contrast to the very low prices of
15Highprices of capital goods may, of course, be counter-balanced by low
interest rates. Moreover, high prospective returns may outweigh high current
costs of construction. These factors in the problem of investment and of
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those producers' goods which are intended for human con-
sumption, after fabrication.(The average price of such
goods, in 1929, was only 29 per cent above the 1913 aver-
age.) The wide margin between these unfinished goods and
goods ready for consumption has been discussed in an earlier
section.1° Equally striking is the contrast between the low
prices paid by producers for goods to be fabricated and the
high prices paid for goods entering into capital equipment.
On the operating side price relations were very favorable
indeed to manufacturing profits. But on the investment side
the situation was less pleasing. Manufacturers reached the
end of the prosperous period of the 1920's with a large vol-
ume of new capital equipment, much of it constructed under
conditions of exceptionally high cost. The full weight of
this burden was not felt while activity remained at high
levels, but after 1929 these capitalized costs became a major
factor in the problem of readjustment.h1
10Thegroup of consumers' goods, the prices of which are given here, in-
cludes both raw and processed goods, although it is more heavily weighted
with the latter. These two subdivisions followed different courses between
1922 and 1929. The one group of raw materials that remained relatively
high in price during this post.War period, and ended the period in a posi
tion of marked price advantage, was composed of goods ready for final con-
sumption in a raw state.
191319221929
Consumers'goods, raw 100 154 175
Consumers' goods, processed 100 155 157
17Constructioncosts enter into the production of both capital equipment
and durable consumers' goods(residences).In the following table the
Engineering News-Record's index of construction costs, which includes wage
rates of labor engaged in the building industries as well as prices of build-
ing materials, is contrasted with general wholesale prices. Costs of construc-
tion were high in 1922, some i8 per cent above wholesale prices (on the
base). During the seven years following wholesale prices showed no net
change, but construction costs rose to a level 40 per cent above that of6o PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
In the existence of a plateau of high prices for goods ready.
for use, whether by final consumers or in an instrumental
way by producers, we have a very significant feature of the
post-War decade. Such a condition places obvious difficulties
in the way of continued movement of goods, in customary
volume and in customary channels. It involves a transference
of purchasing power to fabricators, a reduction in the pur-
chasing power of primary producers and of those ultimate
users (consumers and industrial users of equipment) who
do not profit from the enlarged fabricational margin. De-
ficiencies in the aggregate purchasing power of these groups
may, of course, be temporarily filled if new sources of credit
(such as consumer credit) are being tapped, or if other ele-
ments of income (such as speculative profits) are swelled. It
is possible, too, that equilibrium within the industrial struc-
ture may be re-attained, in the face of such a price situation,
after changes in the division of national income and in the
make-up of the aggregate volume of goods marketed. But a
condition of the first sort (a filling of the voids in the pur-
chasing power of adversely affected groups) would seem to be
necessarily temporary, while a change of the second type (a
alteration in the division of aggregate purchasing
power) would involve very considerable economic and social
changes, if substantial price shifts were to persist. These con-
siderations will concern us when we trace the developments
of the recession that began in 1.92g,and of the succeeding
period of recovery.
wholesale prices. Here wasanimportant additional factor contributing to
high capital costs and to high costs of consumers' goods.
1922 1929 1913 19221929
Constructioncosts 100 119 100 174 207
Wholesale prices . 100 100 100 148 148THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 6i
POST-WAR PRICE SCHISM
There is an obvious relation between the various price
phenomena described in the preceding pages. Relatively low
prices of primary products and high prices of manufactured
goods intended for human consumption and for use in cap-
ital equipment are concomitants of a wide fabricational mar-
gin. The evidence reviewed indicates that in the United
States, prior to the recession of 1929, the margin between the
prices of raw industrial materials and of manufactured goods
was distinctly wider than in pre-War years. The statistical
data show that this condition became pronounced, for the
first time, between 1919 and 1922, although some relative
weakness in raw materials developed between 1917 and
1919.18 The gap opened between the prices of finished
goods and of raw materials intended for fabrication persisted,
in the main, during the entire decade of the 'twenties. In
certain industrial fields the gap was narrowed, and, indeed,
in some fields no such gap existed, but for manufacturing
industries in general the fabricational margin that prevailed
in 1929 was significantly wider than before the War.
18 The major shift between 1917 and 1922 may be traced in the following
index numbers of wholesale prices:
191319171918191919201921 1922
Producers'goods, raw ioo 180 194 195 201itS 127
All processed goods ioo i6g 198 206 240 163 155
Pertinent, also, are data showing the relations between changes in the cost
of materials and in fabrication costs, per unit of product, in manufacturing
industries:
1914191919211923
Costof materials 100 202 156 153
Fabrication costs ioo 209 173 174
(Costsof materials, as reported in the Census of Manufactures, include
some fabrication costs, since semi-finished goods constitute for
many producers.)62 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
The persistence of this margin constitutes one of the most
striking features of the post-War economic situation. It is
notable, for one thing, because its existence represents a
reversal of tendencies that had prevailed in this country for
many years prior to the War. The history of the quarter
century prior to the War is a history of a steady cheapening
of fabricated products in terms of raw materials, a steady
reduction in the cost of the services of manufacturing indus-
tries. The margin is notable, again, because it was not solely
a domestic phenomenon. The post-War world was marked
by a wide disparity, relatively to pre-War standards, between
the prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods. The
terms of exchange between raw material producing areas
(with certain exceptions) and manufacturing areas were
altered, by the events of 19 14—22, to the marked disadvantage
of the former. There developed, to a degree not equaled in
modern times, a price schism between raw material produc-
ing areas and manufacturing areas that materially impeded
the ordinary processes of trade. Some of the economic conse-
quences and accompaniments of this schism—depleted pur-
chasing power and a forced draught to production in raw
material producing areas, reduced volume of trade and
consequent unemployment in industrial areas, uneconomic
movements of short- and long-term loans—have been Out-
standing features of the post-War world, situation.
It is desirable that we briefly summarize the factors that
appear to have contributed to the development of this mar-
gin and to its persistence during the post-War decade, in
direct reversal of earlier tendencies. In doing so we shall be
speaking primarily of the domestic situation in the United
States although certain world conditions bear upon it.
The sharp widening of the fabricational margin occurred
in the price recession of 192o—21. As factors affecting this
movement we may note the following:THE P:RE-REcEssIoN SITUATION 63
a. The usual sensitiveness of raw material prices to the forces
of economic recession, and the greater stability of the prices of
finished goods. The reasons for this difference are many, includ-
ing the inelasticity of demand for many primary products, the
inability of primary producers to limit supply in the face of fall-
ing demand (contrasted with the high degree of control exerted
over the output of most fabricated products) and the greater im-
portance of relatively fixed costs in the production of manufac-
tured goods.
b. The accentuation of this sensitiveness of raw material prices
by an exceptionally weak position at the end of the War. A
forced draught had been applied during the War to the produc-
tion of raw material.s throughout the world. Indeed, as we have
already noted, the peak of raw material prices in the United
States in relation to general prices occurred in 1917.Thereafter
the prices of manufactured goods rose more sharply. 'This rela-
tive weakness, appearing prior to the peak of the War-time
boom, is highly significant. The ending of the War left large
stocks on hand, and the expansion of production by the warring
countries, with the end of the fighting, intensified these diffi-
culties.
c. The customary lag of wage rates and overhead charges, at a
time of price recession. Here, again, the usual tendency towards
a relative increase in fabricational costs, as a result of this lag,
was accentuated by the magnitude and intensity of the general
price decline. During the preceding advance of prices, from 1914
to1920,laborshori:age and War-time demands had stimulated
a sharp rise in wage rates. Much of this gain was held during
the sharp break of prices in 1920and1921.
d.The violence of the first post-War price recession and its
brief duration, relatively to the magnitude of the change in the
price level. In 1920—21theaverage level of wholesale prices
dropped 45 per cent in twenty months. This was almost three
times the intensity (in rate of decline per month) of the 1929—33
declineand four times the intensity of the 1873—79pricedrop.
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flexible and inflexible prices was inevitable. Time was not given
for adaptation and adjustment. Subsequent readjustment was, of
course, to be expected, barring the presence of factors tending
to perpetuate the conditions that developed during the recession.
World conditions of supply and demand, the customary
behavior of the prices of different classes of goods, the rela-
tively strong position of agents of fabrication in 1920—21
andthe intensity of the drop in general prices all contributed
to the initial widening of the fabricational margin, and to
the consequent depressing of raw material prices and the
elevation (relatively) of the prices of finished goods. But the
emergence of the margin, as a cyclical phenomenon, was in
accord with experience. What was altogether exceptional was
the persistence of these conditions during the succeeding
eight years of economic expansion and of rapidly rising
productivity in manufacturing industries. We list below cer-
tain factors that appear to have played important roles in
these years:
a. The continued weak position of primary producers. The
effects of the War-time stimulus to the output of raw materials
did not pass over night. Large from new sources, com-
bined with the re-entry of producers in the former combatant
countries, maintained price weakness among raw materials.'9
Actual cost reductions in. the production of certain raw mate-
rials, as a result of gains in productivity, served also to lower
prices. This was a factor of considerable importance in the out-
put of certain minerals and of some farm products. The post-War
years witnessed considerable, improvement in technical methods
of mineral extraction and of agricultural production. Price de-
clines reflecting cost reductions do not necessarily involve reduc-
19Weshould note, however, that for raw materials in general'the effects
of war stocks and war expansion... hadworn off before t929"(Copeland,
bc. cit., p. 44). We must look, in the main, to other conditions for an ex-
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tion of incomes. However, such cost reductions are never effected
uniformly, by all prc'ducers. Lowered costs by some, particularly
by large producers, may change the location of the margin of
production, forcing 1:0themargin, or beyond it, producers for-
merly comfortably within it. In such an industry as farming,
where complete retirement from production is difficult, this con-
dition may cause rea.l and persistent distress.
b. The persistence of a price level some 35 per cent below that
of 1920.Hadprices moved upwards again, to the approximate
pre-recession level, wage costs and overhead costs in manufactur-
ing industries would probably have been reduced, relatively, and
earlier relationships with prices in general approximated. The
customary lag of such costs would have contributed to this read-
justment. But the gains scored by the agents of fabrication
during recession were consolidated, in large part, because of the
succeeding stability of prices at a level close to that reached in
the 1921depression.
c. The economic strength of industrial labor. The prolonged
expansion that followed the first post-War depression began just
when immigration restriction was curtailing the supply of indus-.
trial labor, particularly unskilled labor. Thus the bargaining
position of labor was strong in these early years of expansion, and
this circumstance contributed to the maintenance of the earlier
gains in real wage rates. Related to this, but arising from other
conditions as well, were the high living costs and high living
standards of industrial labor after the War. There are, of course,
circular relations here. Living standards were high, in part, be-
cause a wide manufacturing differential made it possible for
high wages to be paid. But there is something more to it than
this. The high standards gained during the War tended to per-
petuate themselves. Wage earners, and allother consuming
groups, cling tenaciously to gains in standards of living. This
became a positive factor, tending to maintain the wide differen-
tial of the early post-War years.
d. The possible increase in distributional costs. During the
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and other forms of selling pressure received new emphasis. These
costs were reflected in the prices paid by final consumers. We
cannot say whether or no this selling pressure actually increased
volume of sales sufficiently to reduce distributional costs per unit
of product. They may well have done so in some industries.
Where advertising is largely competitive, drawing business from
other producers instead of promoting an increase in aggregate
sales, increased advertising would add to the average per unit
cost of goods sold. Some such addition was probably made during
the expansion of the 1920'S. Certainly the persistence of a high
level of prices to consumers does not indicate that the great
expansion of advertising in these years served to lower the living
costs of the population at large.
e. Quality changes, representing actual increases in the degree
of fabrication to which the materials of manufacture were sub-
ject. In 1929 (and in 1933) the actual physical services of fabri-
cators constituted a larger proportion of the bundle of materials
and services bought by the final consumer than in 1914. Improve-
ments in the quality of mechanical goods and the grading and
packaging of food products are obvious examples of changes of
this type. Perhaps some of this extra service, as in the making
of ornate containers, was not a real gain to the consumer. Never-
theless, the service was rendered and a higher fabricational mar-
gin was required to pay for it. This emphasis on quality changes,
real or apparent, and the desire to give specific products special
appeal through refinements of fabrication, were probably more
characteristic of the years since 1914 than of the period before.
If so, they help to explain the curious reversal in the relative
trends of prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods that
occurred after 1914.
f. Fortuitous additions to the purchasing power of consumers.
It was not enough to ensure the persistence of relatively high
rewards to fabricators that their bargaining position should be
strong, or that the position of primary producers should be weak.
It was necessary that the buyers of finished products be able to
purchase, in quantity, at the relatively high price level prevailing
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tute an important element of the total body of consumers, would
tend to lower the aggregate income and purchasing power of con-
sumers. High returns to fabricators would tend, of course, to
maintain such purchasing power, but fabricators constitute only
one restricted part of the total consuming group. Something
more than the boot straps of fabricators was needed to maintain
the buying power of consumers at large at levels necessary to
ensure the marketing of an expanding volume of consumers'
goods at post-War prices. Three circumstances contributed to
the enhancement of consumer purchasing power during the
period of expansion that began in 192 1—2 2. Some of the proceeds
of heavy foreign loans served, directly or indirectly, to finance
the purchase of consumers' goods in the United States. Many of
the profits realized from speculative operations in real estate and
securities found the same outlet. Not least important was the
swelling of consumer purchasing power by the tapping of the
new reservoirs of credit—consumer credit—through which install-
ment selling was financed. During the expansion of such credit
the additions to the total volume outstanding represented net
increases in the current buying power of All these
20 These sums, while not of great magnitude in any one year, relatively to
total national income, constituted a steady addition to the current income
of consumers during the decade preceding the recession. The following table
(based upon estimates given in Lough and Gainsbrugh, High-Level Con-
sumption, McGraw-Hill, p. 312)indicatesthe magnitude of the annual
additions to consumer income between 1919 and 1929. The debts of which
account has been taken. in preparing this table include those arising from
purchases and from personal loans. All sums are in millions of dollars.
NET CHANGE IN
CONSUMER PUR-
TOTALSHORT- ANNUAL CHANGE IN CHASINCPOWER
TERM CON- TOTAL CON- CARRYING FROM PRECEDING
SUMER DEBTS SUMEP. DEBTS CHARGES YEAR
1919 5443
1920 6ooG +563 + 1 +562
192,1 6ii8 +112 +78 + 34
1922 6053 —65 —3' — 34
1923 6829 +776 +47 +729
1924,. 7190 +561 +14 +347
1925 7675 +485 +54 +43'
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elements were essentially non-recurring. They bolstered the de-
mand for goods during the major expansion of the 'twenties, and
supported the price relations we have described. There was no
promise in this situation, however, that these price relations
would be stable when consumer buying power was again con-
fined to disbursements arising from the normal productive opera-
tions of the economy.
g. Favorable conditions for sellers in the markets for capital




TOTALSHORT- ANNUAL CHANGEIN CIIASINGPOWER
TERM CON- TOTAL CON- CARRYING FROM PRECEDING
SUMERDEBTS SUM ER DEBTS CHARGES YEAR
1926 7914 +239 +47 +192
1927 8177 +263 +53 +210
1928 8786 +609 +55 +554
1929 9477 ±691 +58 +633
Thederivation of the final entries may need a word of explanation. The
increment of 563 dollars from 1919 to 1920representsnew purchas-
ing power placed in the hands of consumers in1920. However, carrying
charges on short-term consumer debts, which had amounted to 384 million
dollars in 1919, came to 385 millions in 1920. Thus the net increase in con-
sumer purchasing power from 1919 to 1920 was 563 millions less one million,
or 562 million dollars. The figures for other years were similarly derived.
With but one exception, each of these ten.years was marked by a net adcli-
tiofl(over the preceding year) to consumer buying power, as a result of
increasing loans to consumers. In four of the ten years the increase exceeded
500 million dollars. These figures are the more significant if we recall that
they represent increases on a continually expanding base.
The above interpretation of the consumer debt figures differs from that
given by Lough and Gainsbrugh. These authors deduct the total carrying
charges each year from the figures representing annual changes in total
short-term consumers' debts. If the changes from one year to the next in
the actual sums available to consumers for the purchase of goods are being
computed, the Lough-Gainsbrugh procedure involves the assumption that no
payments on account of carrying charges were made during the first year.
This is obviously faulty. If the amount of consumer debts and annual carry-
ing charges were constant from year to year, there would clearly be no
change, from one year to the next, in the sums availableconsumersfor
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were favored by similar fortunate circumstances during the ex-
pansion of the 'twenties. Low rates for capital funds, high profits,
which facilitated the growth of corporate surpluses, and a spirit
of optimism, which inspired business men to expand their plants
and ad.d to equipment without severe scrutiny of costs, stimu-
lated heavy sales of capital equipment. Under the circumstances,
relatively high prices for such equipment did not dampen sales.
These, then, were important factors contributing to the
creation and persistence of the exceptionally wide post-War
margin between the prices of raw materials and manufac-
tured goods and to the high price level of finished goods. It
may, indeed, be argued that the persistence of these condi-
tions was due to the incompleteness of the liquidation and
readjustment effected between 1920and1922.Thatviolent
world-wide price recession would be considered a first stage
in a necessary process of readjustment; :thereafter fortuitous
conditions made possible a recovery in the United States
before readjustment was completed. But we do not know
enough about the conditions essential to economic stability
to be sure that this was the case. The relations revealed by
a study of. post-War prices and their comparison with pre-
War relations would not be inconsistent with such an hy-
pothesis, however.
We have noted certain conditions on the operating side
which bear upon this post-War price differential. Quality
changes, reflecting more intensive fabrication, occurred in
many manufacturing industries. Where the finished product
thus represented a greater relative contribution on the part
of fabricators and increased utility to consumers, some expan-
sion in the manufacturing differential and some rise in the
price of the finished goods were to be expected. Yet this
cannot be looked upon as the sole or indeed as the chief
factor in the widening of the differential. A detailed study,
by industries, reveals increased costs of fabrication as a typ-70 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ical post-War condition, prevailing where quality changes
are known not to have occurred, as well as where they did
occur.
On the other hand, as against increased contributions of
fabricators, industrial productivity increased notably during
the decade 1919—29. Output per wage earner employed in
manufacturing industries increased 15 per cent from 1921
to 1923. This followed a gain of i per cent, from 1919 to
192i,and was followed by a gain of 8 per cent, from 1923
to 1925. In part, these gains in productivity were due to
heavier capital investment, and the installation of better
equipment. But the actual reduction of production costs, it
is fair to assume, more than offset the average gain in quality,
among manufactured products. That the increase of produc-
tivity occurred concurrently with a widening, instead of a
contracting, fabricational margin is noteworthy. We shall
be concerned at a later point with some economic conse-
quences of enhanced industrial productivity accompanied by
a wide fabricational margin.
PURCHASING POWER OF MAJOR PRODUCING GROUPS, 1929
The significance of changes among the various elements
of the price structure is not always readily apparent to the
economic agents involved. Of immediate concern to these
agents are the shifts in actual command over goods that fol-
low directly upon changes in the relations among prices. We
turn now to a brief survey of the changes in the relative
status of different economic groups, in respect of aggregate
purchasing power prior to 1929. We deal here only with
general movements, for the available data do not (make pos-
sible a high degree of accuracy in the measurement of pur-
chasing power changes.
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the aggregate purchasing power of a given economic group
over a stated period.: changes in the average per unit price
of its products (or services), changes in the quantity pro-
duced and sold, and changes in the average price of the com-
modities and services for which its money income is ex-
pended. Obviously, records of these changes are not to be
had for all important economic groups. Indeed, they are not
available, in detail and with a high degree of accuracy, for
any economic group. For a few major groups, however, we
may approximate the changes in these factors with sufficient
accuracy to obtain fairly reliable indications of the changes
in their aggregate purchasing power. In picturing the general
situation prevailing in 1929wetake 1914 as a standard of
reference.
In 1929 the aggregate physical volume of production in
the United States(excluding construction) was approxi-
mately 64 per cent greater than in 1914. If the net gains of
these fifteen years had been divided equally among all pro-
ducing groups an in.crease of this amount would have been
recorded in the total volume of goods commanded by each
group, that is, in its aggregate purchasing power, as that
term is here used. Actually, of course, no such equality is
found. Following is a summary of the changes among certain
important producing groups:
PRODUCERS OF RAW MATERIALS
Farm ers
Aggregate purchasing power in 1929 some 20 per cent greater
than in 1914, in wholesale markets, io per cent greater in
the markets in which farmers actually spent their money.
The advance in farmers' purchasing power was due primarily
to increased farm output, which was i i per cent greater in
1929 than in 1914. The per unit purchasing power of farm
products advanced in wholesale markets, declined somewhat
in the markets in which farmers buy.72 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
Producers of raw mineral products
Aggregate purchasing power in wholesale markets in 1929 ap-
proximately twice that of 1914.Thisgain was the net re-
sultant of an increase of about 70 per cent in volume of pro-
duction and of about 20 per cent in the purchasing power of
each unit produced.
Producers of raw forest products
Aggregate purchasing power in wholesale markets in 1929
about i8 per cent greater than in 1914. This gain was the net
resultant of a drop of some 6 per cent in number of units
produced, an advance of about 25 per cent in average pur-
chasing power per unit.
AGENTS OF FABRICATiON
All agents
Aggregate purchasing power of all agents of fabrication(i.e.,
those whose rewards are secured from the differential between
costs of materials to manufacturers and the selling price of
manufactured goods) in 1929 in wholesale markets approxi-
mately 120 per cent greater than in 1914. This gain resulted
from an increase in output of some 84 per cent and in per
unit purchasing power of about 20 per cent.
Manufacturing labor
Aggregate purchasing power in i 929 about 71percent greater
than in 1914,owingchiefly to an increase of 77percent in the
physical output of manufacturing labor. The actual purchasing
power of the pay received for each unit of goods produced
declined about 8 per cent, with reference to the items included
in the budget of the average industrial worker. (If purchasing
power changes in wholesale markets be measured, for compar-
ison with similar measurements for other groups, we have
advances of ioo per cent in aggregate purchasing power,
12 per cent in per unit purchasing power.) The change in
rewards per unit of goods produced is to be interpreted with
reference to a gain of approximately 49 per cent in outputTHE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION
per wage earner in manufacturing industries between 1914
and1929.
Ownership and in manufacturing industries
Aggregate purchasing power in wholesale markets in 1929 ap-
proximately 135percent greater than in 1914.Thegain was
due to an increase in output of about 90percent, in per unit
purchasing power of approximately 23 per cent.2'
These several estimates of changes in the aggregate pw-
chasing power of important producing groups are not per-
fectly comparable, and indeed, in default of accurate index
numbers of the prices prevailing in the markets in which
these groups spend their money incomes, it is impossible to
secure comparable measurements. With this important quali-
fication, we may. use these measurements as indications of
certain major changes in the distribution of purchasing
power between 1914and1929. We should note, in so using
them, that we do not have here measurements of net income
distribution, either personal or by functional groups. No ac-
count is taken of the deductions from gross returns necessary
for the determination of net incomes, nor is attention given
to changes in amount of investment or in the numbers of
income recipients in the several groups named. But as in-
dexes of movements over a fifteen-year period in certain
broad divisions of gross income, in physical terms, the mea-
surements throw light on important phases of economic
change.
Among the three major groups, farmers, mineral extrac-
tors and those engaged in manufacture, the last-mentioned
21SeeEconomic Tendencies in the United States, pp. 505—13,foran explana-
tion of the procedure employed in deriving these measurements, and for a
fuller explanation of their significance. Because of revisions in the original
sources the present measurements differ in some respects from those in
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scored the major gain. With a total output some 8o per cent
greater than in 1914,theiraggregate physical rewards more
than doubled. Mineral producers gained only slightly less,
while the aggregate gains of farmers approximated io per
cent. Among manufacturing producers labor gained about
70percent, in aggregate purchasing power; the residual
share going to ownership and management advanced about
135percent.
These figures represent the resultants of mixed forces, in-
distinguishably blended. In part they reflect cyclical changes
in the real incomes of farmers, mineral producers, manufac-
turing labor, and owners and investors in manufacturing
enterprises. In part they define deep-seated and enduring
shifts in the relative importance of these elements of the
national economy. The expansion of manufacturing plant
with the growing industrialization of the country would
of itself lead to permanent alterations in the division of
aggregate physical output among producing groups. Sirni-
lar fundamental changes affected other groups.
We should note the particularly striking gains of those
engaged in manufacturing, which accompanied a notable
increase in industrial productivity. The advance in output
per worker between 1914and1929wasabout 49 per cent;
in the ten years 1919—29itexceeded 40percent. Over the
manufacturing field as a whole this striking increase in
efficiency was not reflected in lower selling prices. The
immediate benefits accrued to agents of fabrication—labor,
management, ownership, and the service agencies whose
compensation is included in the 'value added' by manufac-
ture. Some of the economic consequences of the increase in
productivity and the division of the resulting gains during
the post-War decade will concern us at a later point, after
the record of the recession and the recovery has been sur-
veyed.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 75
THE WOR:LD PRICE STRUCTURE IN 1929
The function performed within national boundaries by a
domestic price structure is performed for the world economy
by a world-wide system of related prices. The flow of raw
materials from colonial to industrial areas, the reverse move-
ment of manufactured goods, the interchange of manufac-
tured goods among industrial nations are all directed with
reference to price relations. More broadly, the productive
activities of different, economies are coordinated and capital
movements and short-term lending are directed in terms of
these same relations. Through this mechanism the elements
of production costs are in some degree controlled and the
various parts of the world economy are held in some sort
of equilibrium.
But the system of world prices is not a perfect agency for
the coordination of international economic processes. In even
greater degree than the domestic structure it is subject to the
play of disturbing forces, which prevent the proper perform-
ance of the functions suggested. These disturbing forces were
especially strong between 1914 and 1929;asa result the
world price system of differed from that of 1914not
only in internal structure but, as well, in its efficiency as a
coordinating agent.
The price structure of 1914constituteda fairly satisfac-
tory instrument for the regulation of international economic
activities. The gold standard extended over the industrial
world, and its operation held international price movements
in reasonable balance. The general price advance of the
twenty years preceding had affected different domestic price
structures in much the same way. Differences in standards
of living and in production costs prevailed, of course, and
tariff barriers existed. In part, these differences were corn-
perisated by corresponding differences in industrial produc-76 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tivity; to the degree that this was not true there had been
adaptation to them over the several decades of fairly undis-
turbed relations that had previously prevailed. After 1914,
however, a number of forces were at work, tending to alter
price relations and to affect the efficiency of the world price
system. The factors and conditions of major importance to
an understanding of the 1929 structure of world prices may
be discussed under three general headings.
ECONOMIC NON-INTERCOURSE AND THE WORLD PRICE
STRUCTURE
From i 914 to 1918 the War set barriers to free economic
intercourse between important elements of the world econ-
omy. Even where no definite barriers were set up, the chan-
nels and the character of trade were so fundamentally altered
by the exigencies of war as substantially to modify the
economic relations of certain countries and, in effect, to iso-
late important elements of their economic life,so far as
international competition was concerned. Severe currency
disturbances, some of which persisted for seven or eight years
after the Armistice, combined with the general disruption of
the gold standard to prolong this period of non-intercourse,
so that in all over a decade passed before the way was open
to the resumption of earlier relations among important trad-
ing countries. During this period the usual checks to the
continuance of divergent tendencies among different ele-
ments of the world economy were inoperative. The coritin-
ual adjustments customarily made among economies closely
bound by trade and financial ties were prevented, and ex-
treme divergencies persisted. The full force of these accumu-
lated results of non-intercourse was felt when trading rela-
tions were again established. The different elements of the
world economy were no longer in gear, as parts of a workingTHE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 77
world order.' Economic disharmonies and inconsistencies
abounded.
•It would be far from accurate to say that all these dis-
harmonies originated in disparate price changes. For the
origins of the unbalanced and discrepant conditions that
appeared during the era of non-intercourse were to be found,
in the main, in the general economic systems of the various
nations. Trade was over-developed in one region, in relation
to the needs of a reconstructed world order; population was
excessive in another, in relation to the world situation that
existed when trading relations were generally re-established;
production costs ingiven industries might be entirely out of
line with those of competitors, once the period of non-inter-
course was terminated. Yet, whether the price structure
occupied a primary or secondary place with respect to the
origins of these economic discrepancies, it is true that the in-
equalities, as direct obstacles to the resumption of trade
relations, found expression most directly through the price
system.
Evidence of such faulty adjustments is especially difficult
to obtain. Trade between countries is not conducted on the
basis of relations between price levels, as measured by the
familiar index numbers of prices. Trade proceeds on the
basis of innumerable specific relations among pri'ces, wages
and costs of production; these specific relations were broken
or distorted during the disturbed years following 1914.In-
formation on these rikimerous individual relations is not
generally available, and we are forced to lean heavily on the
less pertinent index numbers. Some conclusions of value
may be drawn from their study. Gold prices are used, since
international relations are in question.
In measuring the divergence of price levels in different
countries between 1913and1929wesuffer from lack of
perfect comparability of the available measurements. Index78 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
numbers differ in respect of content and technical methods
of construction. It is probable, however, that the general
picture would not be materially changed if fully comparable
index numbers were available.
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souRcEs: League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book, 1934—1935,pp.
227—29; Handbook of Foreign Currency and Exchange, U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Trade Promotion Series No. 102, Washington, D. C., 1930
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The differences among wholesale price levels, ranging
from a fall of 7percent for Austria to a rise of 66 per cent
for Australia, are fairly wide, though not excessive in terms
of pre-War experience. The single averages do not, of course,
convey any accurate picture of the status of the various na-
tional price structures It was within and among the elements
of these price structures—among production costs, wages,
costs of capital equipment, and all the prices of individual
commodities and services entering into international trade—
that faulty adjustments prevailed, serving as barriers to free
economic intercourse.
DISPARITIES IN PRODUCTION COSTS
In periods not marked by extreme disturbances in inter-
national economic relations production costs in different
trading countries stand in certain rather definite relation-
ships. Through the play of competition import and export
trade is adapted, in respect of content and price, to differing
production costs in different countries. The elements of
fabrication cost (i.e., wages, interest charges and other over-
head expenses, and the related factor of industrial produc-
tivity) do not ordinarily suffer violent change, so that trading
relations based upon established conditions of cost are not
subject to sudden alteration. In the post-War price structure,
however, elements of cost, in different producing countries,
were widely diverse and their relations were quite different
from those existing before the War.
Differences in price levels would be expected to lead to
differences of this sort, but many of the inequalities of cost
actually prevailing could not be thus explained. For two
countries may have identical gold price levels, with reference
to a given base, but the internal relations among elements
of their domestic price structure may be quite different, as a8o PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
result of recent inflationary or deflationary movements. De-
flation, with the characteristic lagging of wages and of all
fixed charges, leaves production costs high, relatively tp
other elements In the price structure, while inflation, accom-
panied by the same lags, creates a price structure in which
production costs are relatively low. Such cost differences
were of particular importance after the stabilization efforts
of the middle 'twenties, for the restoration of the gold stand-
ard offered wide opportunities for variation in the relation
of old and new parities, and such variations were reflected
in disparate cost conditions.
Direct information concerning production costs is difficult
if not impossible to obtain, for most industrial countries. We
may get some evidence on this important point by comparing
wholesale prices and living costs in certain countries. These
two sets of index numbers are not directly comparable, for
they are composed of quite different items, but the relations
between them are significant. Living costs, a highly impor-
tant factor in determining the purchasing power of wages,
are directly related to production costs. Where living costs
are relatively high, the cost of labor tends to be high; the
reverse is true where living costs are low, in relation to a
standard prevailing in a base period not too far removed in
time. As has been noted, living costs lag behind wholesale
prices during periods of changing price levels. They tend,
thus, to be relatively high after a deflationary movement of
the price level and relatively low after an inflationary move-
ment. Index numbers of wholesale prices and living costs for
seven important industrial countries are given in Table 3.
We find a considerable range of difference among these
seven countries, with to the ratio of living costs to
wholesale prices. Czechoslovakia and France stood at the
lower end of the scale, as countries with relatively low pro-
duction costs in 1929,interms of this standard, while theTHE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 8i
TABLE 3
WHOLESALE PRICES AND LIVING COSTS, 1914-1929
SEVENINDUSTRIALCOUNTRIES
RATIOS OF COST
OF LIVJNG INDEX TO
I N D E XN U M B E R SINDEX OF WHOLESALE
WHOLESALE PRICES LIVING COSTSPRICES, AS RELATIVES
1914 1929 1914 1929 1914 1929
Czechoslovakia ioo 913 100 763 100 84
France ioo 615 100 556 100 90
Japan ioo 175 100 i8i 100 103
Germany ioo' 137 1001. 154 iOO1 112
Italy 1001 481 100 545 1002 113
UnitedKingdom ioo 136 100 164 100 121
United States ioo 140 100 170 100 121
SOURCE: League of Nations, StatisticalYear-Book, 1935—1936, pp.
239—44.
11913100.
2 Wholesale price index, 1913; living costs index, 1914.
UnitedStates and the United Kingdom stood at the upper
end. There is no clear division into inflationary and defla-
tionary countries here. The relations between wholesale
prices and living costs were affected, of course, by the terms
of stabilization, largely completed between 1924 and 1926,
as well as by the inflationary or deflationary experiences of
the early years of the decade. Tentative and approximate as
this ratio is, the range of 50 per cent between the two ex-
tremes may be taken to represent a real difference in produc-
tion costs, relatively to the 1914situation.22Higher efficiency
might, of course, make possible the maintenance of higher
living costs and living standards, without increasing produc-
tion costs. But variation in respect of productivity changes
over these fifteen years could hardly be as great as the dif-
ferences indicated.
22 No assumption is here made that production costs in these countries were
equal in 1914. The relations of 1914 were modified, in the degree indicated.82 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
DISPARITIES BETWEEN PRICES OF RAW MATERIALS AND
MANUFACTURED GOODS
In discussing the post-War price structure of the United
States attention has been called to the disparity, world-wide
in scope, between the prices of materials intended for in-
dustrial use and the prices of finished goods. Here and there,
special conditions made it possible for certain groups of raw
material producers to exchange their goods on relatively
favorable terms for manufactured products, but in general
the post-War status of raw material producers the world
over was distinctly less favorable than before the War. Al-
though the situation in this respect was somewhat better in
1929 than in 1921, disparities persisted. Their effects were
far reaching, influencing the major economic movements of
tries. Thus a bushel of wheat, as quoted in the central world
market at Liverpool, had in 1929 a purchasing power for
manufactured goods in the United States i 2 per cent below
that of 1913. The worth of a bushel of wheat in Liverpool
in terms of goods exported from the United Kingdom
(mainly manufactured goods) was i6 per cent less in 1929
than in 1913. The same commodity had a 1929 value in
terms of manufactured goods in Germany i6 per cent less
than in 1913. But the table tells its own story. In
coffee, tobacco and, for certain markets, tea, wool
the period and coloring the whole post-War epoch.
The existence of this disparity has been noted by various
observers, and the fact of its persistence beyond the period
of the usual cyclical divergence of prices of raw and proc-
essed goods has been emphasized. One ofits phasesis
rather strikingly revealed by the measurements in Table 4.
For each of twenty-one raw materials, as priced in various
world markets, Table 4 defines changes in purchasing power
for manufactured goods in three important industrial coun-
1929 only
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TABLE 4
CHANGES IN THE PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER OF IMPORTANT
RAW MATERIALS, 1913-1929
PURCHASING POWER OF GIVEN COMMODITY FOR
VARIOUS CLASSES OF GOODS
FOR
FOR MAN 11- FOR MAN UFAC-
FACTURED GOODS,EXPORTED GOODS, TURED GOODS,
UNITEDSTATES UNITED KINGDOMGERMANY
19131922 19291913 1922 19293913 1929
Wheat
England,Liverpool ioo 88 88 1007684 10084
Canada,Winnipeg 10090100 1007795 10096
U.S., Chicago ioo Bi87 10069 83 10084
Australia,Melbourne ioo 9187 10077 10084
Rica
France, Marseilles ioo6966 1005963 10063
U. S., New Orleans ioo7566 too6463 10064
Sugar
England,London 1008455 1007253 10053
U. S., New York 1008772 1007468 10069
Coffee
Netherlands, Amsterdamtoo69io6 10059101 100102
U. S., New York ioo70110 1006o105 100io6
Tea
England,London 1008493 1008o89 10090
Netherlands, Amsterdamioo97iiø 10083105 100io6
U.S., NewYork ioo79 100678i 1008i
Cocoa
England, London ioo4851 1004148 10049
Netherlands, Amsterdamioo8892 1007588 10089
U. S., New York ioo4967 1004264 10064
Tobacco
Netherlands,Amsterdamioo145275 100124262 100264
U.S., Louisville ioo105124 10090118 100119
Lord
U. S.,New York ioo6872 100 69 10069
Nitrate of Soda
U. S., New York ioo6658 1005755 100
France, Dunkerque 100776i tOO66 10059
Cotton
England,London 10010197 1008793 10094
U.S.. New Orleans ioo10497 1008992 1009384 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 4 (cont.)
CHANGESIN THE PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER OF IMPORTANT
RAW MATERIALS, 1913-1929
PURCHASINGPOWER OF GIVEN COMMODITY FOR
VARIOUS CLASSES OF GOODS
FOR
FOR MANU- FOR MANUFAC-
FACTURED GOODS,EXPORTED GOODS, TURED GOODS,
UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
Wool 19131922 19291913 1922 19291913 1929
England,London ioo122102 10010597 10098
U. S., Boston ioo142ii6 100122110 100112
Australia,Melbourne ioo 92102 10079 97 10098
Silk
U.S.,New York ioo128 89 100110 85 10086
France, Lyon ioo124 100io679 10079
Japan, Yokohama ioo15390 10013086 100 87
Hides,cattle
England,London ioo6665 10056 62 10062
U.S., Chicago ioo64 6i 10054 58 10059
Pigiron
Germany, Essen 100 74 100 71 10072
England, London ioo9179 1007875 10076
Copper
England, London ioo54 73 1004669 10070
Germany, Berlin ioo 78 100 75 10076
U. S. 10055 76 10047 73 10073
Lead
England, London ioo7684 100658o 1008i
U. S., NewYork 10085102 10073 97 10098
Germany, Berlin ioo 8o 100 76 10077
France, Paris ioo76 8o 10065 77 10077
Zinc
England,London ioo 7772 100666g 1006q
U. S., NewYork ioo 68 77 10058 74 10074
Germany,Hamburg ioo 72 100 68 10069
France, Paris ioo76 72 100 69 10070
Tin
England,London ioo46 67 1004064 10064
U. S., NewYork 10047 66 1004063 10064
Rubber
England,London iooi6i8 100 13 17 100i8
U.S., NewYork ioo 14 17 100 12 16 100i6THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 85
TABLE 4(cont.)
CHANGES IN THE PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER OF IMPORTANT
RAW MATERIALS, 1913-1929
PURCHASING PO%VER OF GIVEN COMMODITY FOR
VARIOUS CLASSES OF GOODS
FOR
FOR MANU- FOR MANUFAC-
FACTORED GOODS,EXPORTED GOODS, TURED GOODS,
UNITED STAlES UNITED KINGDOMGERMANY
19131922 19291913 1922 19291913 1929
Newsprint
Canada, Ottawa 10010382 1008878 10079
Sweden ioo8978 1007674 10075
Woodpulp
Canada 1008i87 1006g 10084
SOURCE: The original price series are given in the Bulletin Mensuel de l'Office
Permanent, Institute International de Statistique, La Haye. The prices have
been converted to a gold basis.
had real exchange values, in terms of the products of these
three industrial countries, exceeding those of 1913. The real
worth, per unit, of each of the other sixteen commodities fell
below the 1913 level, far below for some commodities.
If we pass from the records of individual commodity prices
to index numbers purporting to measure changes in the
average prices of raw and of processed goods, we face diffi-
culties in securing adequate and unambiguous statistics.
Satisfactory index numbers of the prices of raw and of proc-
essed goods are available for only a few countries, and even
these are not designed to meet the purposes of the present
inquiry. Thus the indexes of raw material prices usually in-
clude raw consumers' goods as well as raw producers' goods,
a combination not altogether appropriate to this compar-
ison. However, the records of the prices of raw and manu-
factured goods in various countries are pertinent and require
investigation, even though some reservations must be made
with respect to them. The comparison is shown in Table5.86 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 5
INDEXNUMBERSOF WHOLESALE PRICES OF RAW MATERIALS AND
MANUFACTURED GOODSINVARIOUS COUNTRIES, 1913-1929
COUNTRY AND COMMODITY GROUP 191319221929
Belgium
Raw materials 1001 834
Finished products iooi 905
Canada
Rawand semi-manufactured goods ioo 149 153
Fully and chiefly manufactured goods ioo '44
Denmark
Raw and semi-manufactured goods 100 133
Consumers' goods zoo 169
Germany
Industrial raw materials and semi-manufactured goodsioo 132
Raw materials 2 100 138
Finished goods zoo '57
Italy
Raw materials 100 464
Semi-manufactured goods ioo 450
Finished goods 100 514
Sweden
Rawmaterials ioo 147 135
Semi-manufactured goods ioo 155 141
Finished products 100 196 142
United States
Raw materials 100 133 141
Manufactured goods ioo 155 152
The original index numbers appear in Memorandum on Production
anci Trade, 1923to192&129,Leagueof Nations, 1930, p. 64, and Review of
World Production, 1931,Leagueof Nations, 1932, p.
1 1914==100.
2 Producers' goods only; consumers' goods are omitted.
The records of Canada, Sweden and the United States for
the period 1922—29indicatea progressive cheapening of man-
ufactured goods, in relation to raw materials. The manu-
facturing margin was narrowed in the 'twenties. But in each
of these countries, 1922 was marked by a manufacturing
margin exceeding that of pre-War years. The degree of ex-THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 87
cess ranged from the Canadian figure of some 4 per cent to
the Swedish figure of approximately 33 per cent. Subsequent
events reduced this excess and, for Canada, carried the mar-
gin to a point lower than that of 1913.Butin all the other
countries listed the relative price differential, out of which
the costs of fabrication are met, was greater in 1929thanin
1913.
Themargins here indicated are of necessity measured
roughly. The indexes of raw material prices include in at
least four instances goods ready for consumption, such as
fruits, vegetables, and coal. Yet only products used as raw
materials in processing may be compared in price with man-
ufactured commodities, if the margin available for payment
to agents of fabrication is in question. It is probable that the
margins indicated understate the true differentials, if the
situation in the United States be taken as representative. For
here, while all raw materials in 1929were41percent higher
in price than in 1913,rawmaterials used in production were
only 31percent higher.
A variety of forces combined, then, to create a world
price Structure in 1929quitedifferent from that of 1913.
Manyof the articulations of pre-War days, articulations
which were never perfect but which made it possible for in-
ternational economic intercourse to proceed in a reasonably
efficient manner, were broken. The pre-War equilibrium of
the world economic structure, which was maintained through
price relations of fairly long standing, was seriously disturbed,
though the magnitude of this disturbance was partly con-
cealed by certain necessarily temporary developments of the
first post-War decade.
We have noted three outstanding characteristics of world
prices, as they affected international economic relations.
A definite price schism existed between raw material produc-88 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ing and industrial areas. This schism was in part international,
in part domestic. On the international side it served to divide
the countries of the world into two broad groups, comprehend-
ing colonial or raw material producing areas on the one hand,
industrial areas on the other.
Industrial countries differed considerably with respect to the
level of production costs. Countries that had passed through pe-
riods of inflation, and .that had restored the gold standard on
such terms that domestic prices and costs were low, in relation to
foreign currencies, constituted one general class. Czechoslovakia
and France exemplify this group. The domestic price and cost
structures of other industrial countries, the chief of which were
the United Kingdom and the United States, were built upon
values relatively high, with reference to the general post-War
level of gold prices. But there was no sharp line of division in
this respect, for many factors affected costs. Thus costs were
relatively high in Italy, after stabilization, which was effected at
a level above those at which other countries passing through
post-War inflation had stabilized.
As a result of the accumulated differences of the period of
international non-intercourse or of definitely restricted inter-
course which began in 1914andwhich extended, for some coun-
tries, well into the first post-War decade, numerous other dis-
parities existed among national price structures. Chief of these
were the differences in the levels of gold prices prevailing after
the general restoration of the gold standard in the middle 'twen-
ties. These general differences translated themselves into a very
large number of concrete disparities among the elements of the
various national price structures, and economic relations among
nations were correspondingly impeded. Many such detailed dis-
parities had arisen as a result of more specific causes, operating
during the years of non-intercourse, or of restricted intercourse.
The coordination of elements of the world price structure usu-
ally effected from day to day and month to month when trade
relations are free had been prevented for'many years. When free
tclations were restored, in whole or in part, with the monetaryTHE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 8g
adjustments of the middle 'twenties, the elements of national
price structures were out of gear. Costs, buying and selling prices,
the prices of different categories of goods—all the elements that
are usually adapted one to another through the play of trade
competition—required readjustment on an international scale.
The forced draughts that maintained international trade from
1925to1929didnot effect lasting readjustments, so we come to
1929withgreat discrepancies of this sort still existing. A going
world economy had not been reconstituted by that date.
DIsPARITIEs IN POST-WAR PRICE RELATIONS
The world price structure, as it existed in 1929, was marked
by disparate national price levels, disparate production costs,
and by a world-wide disparity between the prices of the raw
materials of industry and finished industrial products. The
pre-recession history of the domestic price structure of the
United States was characterized,similarly, by extensive
changes in the relations among different elements of the price
system, changes especially pronounced in the relations be-
tween raw and processed goods. These various shifts in price
relations worked in their several spheres to alter the terms
on which goods and services might be exchanged, interna-
tionally and domestically. Some of the alterations were suf-
ficiently great to serve as effective barriers to the movement
of goods. In other instances exchanges were still made, but
the relative positions of the trading groups concerned were
radically different from those that had prevailed earlier. The
distribution of purchasing power, domestically and interna-
tionally, had been substantially altered.
Such alterations in the distribution of purchasing power
are usual accompaniments of economic change. During the
course of any decade in economic history buying power is
shifted from group to group. Th.e world's total output of eco-90 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
nomic goods is never divided in exactly the same proportions
from one year to the next. What is notable, however, is that
the shifts here in question had not been accompanied by
corresponding changes in the techniques or costs of produc-
tion, and that standards of living had not been adapted in
any permanent sense to the purchasing power changes. Cer-
tain of the shifts in purchasing power were due to the play
of non-economic factors (i.e., to post-War political conditions
and relations); in others they were' due to faults in the
mechanism of exchange; in still others they were due to alter-
ations in international economic relations to which adapta-
tion had not yet been effected. The pre-War economic rela-
tions of the nations of the world had been permanently
altered, in important respects. Certain conditions, which in
retrospect we now know to have been temporary, prevented
for a time a realization of the full effects of these economic
difficulties, but the faults persisted.
One aspect of these world-wide disparities has special rele-
vance to the economic situation in the United States. Between
1919 and i 921 a gap, world-wide in scope, was opened be-
tween the prices of raw materials and processed goods. In
magnitude, duration and scope, this gap was without counter-
part in recent economic history. Cyclical recessions and de-
pressions have always brought some such price inequalities.
But no previous recession of which we have record opened
up a gap of such magnitude, which affected so many com-
modities, over such a wide geographical range, and which
persisted for so many years after the original difficulties de-
veloped.
For highly industrialized countries and raw material pro-
ducing countries the gap thus opened was an external schism,
a break that tended to separate the whole economy from
other (complementary) economic systems. The impact of the
break, in respect of purchasing power or employment, wouldTHE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION 91
not necessarily be precisely the same upon all economic
groups, but in general the whole economy would be affected
in somewhat the same way. Thus in a typical raw material
producing area such as the Dutch East Indies, persistent eco-
nomic difficulties with generally reduced purchasing power
would be expected among most elements of the economy,
whether engaged directly in the output of raw materials or
not. A typical industrial area such as the United Kingdom
would feel the effects of low material costs, low purchasing
power of important foreign markets and a depressed state of
business accompanied by extensive unemployment.(Itis
true that protected trades and protected labor forces did not
suffer, in the United Kingdom, as severely as did competitive
trades producing directly for foreign markets. These differ-
ences were in part attributable to rigidities within the British
national economy.)
Of a different order would be the effects of such a schism
on an economy that included both highly industrialized and
raw material producing areas, neither type being dominant.
A more pronounced internal cleavage would here result,
with a clear conflict of interests and of economic fortunes
within the economy. Raw material producers suffering from
low prices of their products would find their aggregate pur-
chasing power seriously impaired, unless price deficiencies
were compensated by heavy output or, temporarily, by bor-
rowing. Industrial producers would find themselves in a
favorable price position, being able to buy materials at rela-
tively low prices and to sell manufactured goods at high
prices. Concrete results of this advantage might not be real-
ized if the purchasing power of consumers at large were
seriously reduced because of the plight of those drawing their
incomes• from the sale of raw materials. If, however, the re-
duced purchasing power of primary producers were offset
by enhanced purchasing power of other consumers, or by the92 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
acquisition of new markets, the state offindustrialproducers
might be very happy. In this case the contrast of economic
fortunes within the economy might be very pronounced
indeed.
To some extent this internal schism affected a number of
national economies, for no countries of economic importance
are exclusively industrial or exclusively devoted to the pro-
duction of raw materials. But the schism was present in most
pronounced form in the United States, where highly indus-
trialized areas co-exist with extensive regions devoted ex-
clusively to the output of raw materials. In the economy of
the United States, therefore, we find the clearest example of
a cleavage sharply separating two major economic groups.
The economic history of the entire post-War decade in the
United States is deeply affected by it, and many of the dis-
tinctive characteristics of the period of expansion and of the
subsequent depression are attributable to the divergence of
the fortunes of the two groups thus distinguished.
The development of this situation in the United States
between 1919and1921 23alteredsharply the internal dis-
tribution of• purchasing power and the conditions under
which the national economy functioned. The persistence of
the situation and the concurrent development of a high state
of industrial prosperity present one of the most striking
paradoxes of economic history. And the aggravation of the
situation during the recession of 1929 raised economic issues
of great complexity in the succeeding years.
Aspects of this cleavage, in the aggravated form that de-
veloped with the recession, will engage us in later pages. We
here summarize certain of its pre-recession aspects.
Raw material producers in the United States faced the same
23SeeEconomic Tendencies, Chs. VII, VIII, IX, for a discussion of Con-
ditionsgiving rise to this situation.THE PRE-RECESSION SITUATION
three alternatives that confronted. such producers in the world
at large: they could expand production in the attempt to offset
the effects of the price loss; they could maintain purchasing
power by borrowing; they could suffer a reduction in their
standard of living. Their actual fortunes during this period re-
flected elements of all three alternatives. A pressure to expand,
or at leastmaintain, output kept the supply of raw materials
at a high level and served to impede what might have been a
normal tendency towards price readjustment. (Inelasticity of dc.
mand for many of the products in question accentuated this
difficulty.) Heavy borrowing, both in the form of mortgage in-
debtedness and of installment buying, supported their inade-
quate purchasing power. But these devices failed to offset the
unfavorable marketing situation, and raw material producers as
a class suffered a substantial loss of purchasing power with a
corresponding decline in their standards of living, relative to
pre-War standards and to the fortunes of other economic groups.
In the face of the reduced purchasing power of raw material
producers, both domestic and foreign, industrial producers were
confronted by the possibility of a considerable reduction in the
volume of their sales, with resulting unemployment and scant
profits, unless the deficiency 8f buying power on the part of
material producers, due to the price schism, could be offset by
gains elsewhere. In large degree it was offset, giving rise to the
paradoxicalsituationnoted—industrial prosperityco-existing
with low purchasing power and, in some degree, real distress
among raw material producers as a class. Various factors con-
tributed to the persistence of this situation in the United States.
These included, in brief:
The gaining of new foreign markets, as a result of the
War and post-War disturbance.
Heavy lending to foreign buyers, on both long and short
term.
The temporary offsetting of part of the reduced purchas-
ing power of raw material producers at home through bor-
rowing and installment buying.94 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
The swelling of the purchasing power of industrial pro-
ducers as a result of their advantageous economic position.
A general increase in the purchasing power of consumers
through the rapid development of installment buying.
The enhancement of purchasing power throughout the
nation through speculative profits, reaped from real estate
and security speculation.
Increasing industrial productivity, which made possible
large profits and high wages without further advance in sell-
ing prices.
Obviously, many of the elements that made possible the simul-
taneous continuance of industrial prosperity and of subnormal
purchasing power and living standards on the part of some
groups of raw material producers were necessarily temporary.
Some of the new elements of purchasing power through which
industrial sales were maintained were clearly of a non-recurring
nature, and plant expansion based upon these was doomed to
certain difficulty. Yet so long as these conditions made it possible
for industrial production and sales to be kept at high levels,
industrial prosperity, high wages and high profits might co-exist
with economic distress among sotne primary producers. As we
have seen, the degree of divergence between the economic for-
tunes of these two great groups within the economy of the
United States had been substantially reduced by 1929,butele-
ments of the fundamental cleavage still existed.
Highly important, as a condition concurrent with the widen-
ing of the fabricational margin in the early post-War years, was
a notable increase in industrial productivity. In manufacturing
industries the gain in output per wage earner exceeded 40per
cent from 1919to1929.Thestriking feature of this situation, as
we have seen, was that the benefits of higher productivity during
this decade were reaped largely by agents of fabrication. The
rewards of primary producers remained relatively low, and
prices to buyers of finished goods remained relatively high. We
shall return, in the final chapter, to a further consideration and
interpretation of this situation and its economic consequences.